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ACTIVE SOVEREIGNTY

TIMOTHY ZICK*

INTRODUCTION

If there was something "revolutionary" about the recent
federalism era, it was the manner in which the Court spoke of
the states.! When they entered the Union, the states were
sometimes referred to as mere corporate forms. 2 In recent
federalism precedents, by contrast, the Rehnquist Court
routinely referred to the states as "sovereign."3 The Court bathed
the states in sovereign glory, inveighing against various federal
insults to the states' "dignity," "esteem," and "respect." 4 The
states are treated now more like nations or persons; they have

* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to thank
John Barrett, Chris Borgen, Brian Tamanaha, and Nelson Tebbe for their helpful
comments. I would also like to thank the participants at the "Federalism Past, Federalism
Future" symposium, and the editors and staff of St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary.
1 See Stephen G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1601
(2002) (asserting that we are "in the midst of a constitutional revolution"). For reasons
stated later, I believe "revolution" overstates matters; this Essay will refer to the "revival"
of federalism.
2 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 463·64, 477, 479 (1966)
(Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1966) (comparing states to corporations).
3 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (''The
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750
(1999) (noting that the Constitution recognizes "the essential sovereignty of the States");
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) ("It is an essential attribute of the
States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous."); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (holding that freedom from federal
commandeering is "an incident of state sovereignty'').
4 See Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 760, 769 (purpose of immunity is to protect state
"dignity" and "respect"); Alden, 527 U.S. at 758 (Congress "must accord States the esteem
due them as joint participants in a federal system"); New York, 505 U.S. at 188
(emphasizing that states are not "mere political subdivisions of the United States" or
"regional offices"); see also Judith Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921
(2003).
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constitutional rights to such things as autonomy, equality, and
due process.5
State sovereignty lies at the heart of perhaps our oldest
constitutional conundrum. On the one hand, when the People
fashioned the Constitution, they created a Union rather than a
confederation of states. On the other, as the Court has said, the
states "entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact."6
In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 7 Justice Kennedy
said that the Framers had "split the atom of sovereignty"
between the states and the national government.8 The federalism
revival located state sovereignty in such things as ''background
principles" of sovereign immunity, as well as notions of state
consent, independence, and autonomy.9 The states would not
have ratified the Constitution, the Court seemed to suggest, if
they believed this would result in offensive federal
encroachments, "commandeering'' of their officials, and waivers
of their "sovereign immunity."
There are those who would object to referring to the states as
sovereign.lO They are not de jure sovereigns, in the sense of being
supreme authorities. Under the Constitution, it is the People
who are supremely sovereign.n When we refer to the states as
"sovereign," it is in a derivative and de facto sense: The People
delegate their sovereignty to the states.
They make this
delegation so that states can serve critical functions on their
behalf. In this respect, state sovereignty and popular sovereignty
are not actually in conflict, but complimentary.
When we debate federalism, it is most often with reference to
the actions of the Supreme Court or Congress. This Essay
approaches federalism, and the recent federalism revival, from
the perspective of the states. The states are often unthinkingly
or reflexively referred to as "sovereign." But what does that tell
5 See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental
States' Rights, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215 (2004).

Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
514 u.s. 779 (1995).
8 See id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
10 See e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 35
(1998) [hereinafter Rakove]; Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3
GREEN BAG 2d 51 (1999) [hereinafter Rakove II].
11 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
6

7
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us, and them, about statehood? What does it actually mean for a
state to be "sovereign" today? Statehood itself is rather thinly
defined in the Constitution. The states' sovereignty is nowhere
mentioned in the text, much less guaranteed to them. Despite
this silence, resort to claims of state sovereignty are common,
indeed increasingly so. The states, in particular, could benefit
from an exposition of their sovereignty. If state sovereignty is to
continue to be part of our constitutional language, the states
must understand what makes for an effective claim to
sovereignty.
The Essay begins with a few general comments on the
functions state sovereignty serves in relation to federalism.
Accepting that it is the People who are ultimately sovereign,
there are still benefits to describing and, what is more important,
treating the states as sovereign entities.
Sovereignty has
enormous rhetorical power. But there is more than rhetoric
involved; invocations of state sovereignty have real consequences.
The normative defense of sovereignty in a most general sense is
that it establishes boundaries and protocols. This is true, by the
way, whether the claim to sovereignty is made by a State, a
nation-state, or our domestic states.12 Sovereignty orders power.
Given their relative disadvantage in terms of such things as
funds and military might, not to mention the massive modern
expansion of federal authority, it is no small matter for states to
be regarded as "sovereign" with respect to an issue or in a policy
area. Insofar as California, or Vermont, is considered to be
"sovereign" - by citizens of their own and other states, and by
other governments - they are more likely to be treated as
deserving of respect and consideration. The idea of "dual
sovereignty" helps to maintain the balance we refer to as
"federalism." Systemically speaking, then, there is value in
respecting the states as states.
If the point of the Court's "sovereignty talk" was to re-order the
federal-state balance of power, the project failed. There is
ultimately very little in the way of substantive payoff for the
states in the federalism revival. The Court was, and remains,
12 This article will refer to a nation or country as a "State." The domestic states will
be identified in the lower case.
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willing to tolerate a host of federal encroachments that, from the
states' perspective, are far from "dignified." This should come as
little surprise. As an institution, the Court is poorly positioned to
maintain something as complex and worldly as statehood or state
sovereignty. It stands ready, as the revival demonstrated, to
invalidate marginally encroaching federal laws. But this sort of
minimalist judging cannot serve as a basis for a substantial reordering of power. Nor is Congress positioned to re-order the
balance of power. To be sure, when political expediency dictates,
legislators sometimes speak in terms of devolution of power to
the states. But Congress has not pushed through any revival of
its own. Indeed, its usual instinct is to preempt the states.
None of this means that state sovereignty is an ineffectual, or
purely rhetorical, concept.
This Essay posits that state
sovereignty is a plausible source for a future federalism revival;
one precipitated by the states. The problem does not lie with the
concept of state sovereignty, but with the Court's flawed
conception of it.
To explain how state sovereignty might result in a meaningful
federalism revival, this Essay will distinguish two conceptions of
state sovereignty.l3 The first conception is the one the Court has
pursued in recent federalism cases.
This conception of
sovereignty anthropomorphizes states. It seeks to elevate the
states by raising their rank or status. It vests states, like nations
or persons, with qualities like "dignity" and "esteem."
It
demands respect for the states as states. Sovereignty, and all of
the corresponding constitutional rights that flow from it, are
judicially conferred. I will call this concept status sovereignty.
The second conception of sovereignty is called active
souereignty.l4
Active sovereignty is the product of some
conceptual borrowing. It is based upon international relations
treatments of sovereignty.l5 This is not to suggest that states and
13 For a more complete elaboration of state sovereignty, see Timothy Zick, Are the
States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229 (2005).
14 The resemblance to Justice Breyer's articulation of "active liberty'' in his recent
book is purposeful. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 4-5 (2005) (distinguishing
"active liberty'' from "civil liberty''). The conception of sovereignty I will be developing in
this paper is of an "active" nature, rather than a defensive and negative one. In that
sense, it resembles the "active liberty" Justice Breyer defends.
15 Representative treatments include JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF
SOVEREIGNTY? THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); ABRAM
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nation-states are sovereign in the same sense.
Rather,
international treatments can help us gain a conceptual foothold
on sovereignty, a new understanding of what sovereignty means
and looks like on the ground. Several observations might be
made in this regard. First, claims to State sovereignty based
solely on status are becoming less and less effective. For
example, intrusions on internal State sovereignty occasioned by
allegations of human rights violations are now commonplace.16
Second, in more general terms, sovereignty has been partitioned
and compromised by conditions such as globalization and the rise
of supra-national governance structures. Third, given these and
other circumstances of modernity, sovereignty is now less a
function of status than of States serving critical functions.
Sovereignty is a resource States must use to earn the respect and
esteem of relevant actors and institutions. Finally, then, States
are sovereign only insofar as they are treated as sovereign in an
area or with respect to an issue.
Sovereignty, then, is partial, behavioral, negotiated, and
relative. It is earned in the world, not bestowed by courts. By
serving functions, States (and states) prop up their own
sovereignty.
Their behavior strengthens future claims to
sovereignty. This is the sovereignty the Framers seemed to have
in mind for the states. It seems a fair inference that the drafters
of the Constitution, while ensuring the states' existence, intended
that their sovereignty was to be earned rather than granted.
Thus, if there is to be a federalism revival, it will not occur in the
Court or Congress. A revival will occur in the states and on the
ground.
It will be a bottom-up, rather than a top-down,
phenomenon.
Given this revision of our understanding of state sovereignty,
the deficiencies of status sovereignty are rather obvious. In brief,
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1996); MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER & JULIE
MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND
APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL
CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996);
CYNTHIA WEBER ET AL., SIMULATING SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE, AND
SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE (1994).
16 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 31, 41-42 (1995-1996) (describing compliance and enforcement trend with regard to
international human rights).
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it is not merely that status sovereignty provides little in the way
of substantive protection or benefit to states. The problem is
much more serious. Status sovereignty is wholly defensive and
negative. It provides no positive way forward for states. It does
not challenge states to rethink or refashion the federal-state
balance on their own terms. Status sovereignty actually imperils
statehood by encouraging this sort of passivity. The lesson of
active sovereignty is that states must view their sovereignty not
as inherent, but as relative and always at stake. Sovereignty, in
other words, is not a matter of being, but doing.
There is some reason for cautious optimism that a federalism
revival based upon principles of active sovereignty might occur.
The states are actively taking the lead on matters of critical
importance to citizens, such as wage reform, environmental
reform, food safety, and access to prescription drugs.17 They are
aggressively taking positions on fundamental social issues like
abortion and same-sex marriage. In some instances, states are
pursuing an independent view of the federal-state balance of
power rather than merely accepting the balance dictated to them
by tradition or static conceptions of what is properly "local."
States are also expanding their role as political communities by
broadening opportunities for direct governance through initiative
and referendum machinery. They are moving beyond traditional
notions of dealing with each other, and with federal authorities,
by pooling or sharing their sovereignty in unique arrangements
and pacts. States are even increasingly rejecting antiquated
notions of their "proper" role in the world. Within limits still
largely undefined, states are acting as, and being treated as, de
facto powers in their own right in international contexts. There
is much more that states could be doing as active sovereigns. If
states take hold of their sovereignty, the beneficiaries of
innovation and activity will not be the states, as under status
sovereignty, but the people.

17 See Pam Belluck, The Not-So United States, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April23, 2006,
at WK 4 (noting a number of policy areas in which states are proceeding on their own,
rather than waiting for federal proposals).
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Statehood and Sovereignty

The core notion of sovereignty traces back to the King, the ursovereign.
Classic sovereigns were considered ultimate
authorities in a territory. In the international context, States
have long suffered encroachments on their internal and external
authority. In the new global social and economic environment,
this is now inevitable.
No state may claim the right, as
sovereign, to violate human rights for example.18 As the
European nations have recently discovered with the advent of the
European Union, sovereignty is not, if it ever truly was, an ali-ornothing proposition.19 If more evidence of this were needed,
consider the long ago transfer of "sovereignty" to the Iraqi
people.2o
Yet sovereignty has not receded into oblivion. Indeed, far from
it. At home and abroad, diplomats, officials, academics, and
courts make claims to and based upon sovereignty. Despite
serious objections from those who find the concept troubling or
even meaningless, sovereignty remains a critical aspect of the
language and structure of governance.21
This Part briefly examines the relationship between state
sovereignty and federalism. It then distinguishes between two
conceptions of sovereignty. The first, "status sovereignty," is the
concept the Supreme Court has relied upon in its recent
federalism revival. The second, "active sovereignty," is derived
from reflections on the function and operation of sovereignty in
the international context. Again, I do not suggest that States
and our domestic states possess identical sovereignties. Our
states can, however, learn something from internationalists
about how State sovereignty is effectively managed and

18 See Henkin, supra note 17, at 41-42 (describing compliance and enforcement trend
with regard to international human rights).
19 See LIESBET HOOGHE & GARY MARKS, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION (2001).
20 See S.C. Res. 1546, ~ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004) (''Reaffirming the
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq.").
21 Skeptical treatments include Rakove, supra note 10, Rakove II, supra note 10, and
CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 15. The debate cannot be joined here. Let it suffice to say
that sovereignty seems no more or less meaningless than, say, the "rule of law," or the
"social contract," or even "democracy." Each of these concepts has changed meaning over
time, to be sure. However, each undoubtedly has meaning.
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maintained. The Part concludes with a discussion of the many
deficiencies of and objections to status sovereignty.
A. Ordering Power
The domestic states are not, of course, classically sovereign.
Having ratified the Constitution, they consented to its
supremacy. They recognized the People's will as controlling. The
states were not granted the external sovereignty of States; they
have no constitutional authority, for instance, to engage in
diplomatic relations with foreign nations. Still, the framers
referred to state sovereignty on several occasions.22 The Supreme
Court has long characterized federalism as based upon the
principle of "dual sovereignty." And the mantra of the federalism
revival was that the states are "sovereign."
If we assume that sovereignty is not, as some skeptics contend,
utterly meaningless, then what does it mean to suggest that a
state in our system of governance is sovereign? How does this
concept relate to federalism? One answer, of course, is that
sovereignty serves as a useful rhetorical device. Skeptics have
long contended that this is the primary function of sovereignty.23
There is indeed powerful symbolism in the concept of state
sovereignty. Moreover, the Court has invoked the term with only
the most minimal discussion of its theoretical basis, which of
course adds to the concern that its use is purely strategic or
political.
But sovereignty is doing more than rhetorical work in the
federalism area. It serves primarily as a shorthand expression
for the idea that states cannot be ignored, mistreated, bullied, or
simply run roughshod over. State sovereignty represents the
idea that there are limits to what federal authorities can ask of
the states as states. It guides and constrains actions within the
constitutional hierarchy the Framers provided. As it does in
22 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987) ("[T]he State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had, and which were not ... exclusively delegated to the United
States."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293-94 (James Madison) ("[T]he States will retain
under the proposed Constitution a very extensive portion of active sovereignty.").
23 See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 10.

2007)

ACTIVE SOVEREIGNTY

549

international contexts, sovereignty marks boundaries. It creates
protocols and various behavioral expectations.
In this respect, the Court is using sovereignty in a most
common fashion, namely to order power. Scholars and statesmen
have recognized that sovereignty serves a variety of functions
related to this core purpose.24 It draws attention to subsidiarity,
reminding superior powers that the interests of "secondary"
institutions must be accounted for, that their views and interests
must be respected. Having this sort of ordering principle is
critical to the domestic states, which labor under the most severe
disadvantages. Statehood itself is only minimally addressed by
the Constitution.25 The states are granted constitutional
permanency; they have, in other words, a fundamental right to
exist. Explicit constitutional rules require that states must be
preserved against attack, dissolution, and territorial violation.26
States are also deemed separate governmental and political
entities; they have the right, generally speaking, to arrange their
own governmental institutions.
States also have critical
participatory rights, including the right to vote on proposed
constitutional amendments.27 Finally, they possess a degree of
interpretive independence with respect to their own laws and
constitutional provisions.
These are minimal guarantees for statehood. Sovereignty
provides a further basis for state claims to legitimacy, deference,
and recognition. It legitimizes and empowers states, allowing
them to operate as if they are positioned to resist a superior
federal authority, even if in reality they are not so positioned.
State sovereignty provides leverage at the bargaining table.
Indeed, states often negotiate to have the "final say" on critical
matters like education or health policy, even in the face of federal
policies that are constitutionally supreme. Finally, sovereignty
24 For a discussion of the usefulness of sovereignty in this regard, see FOWLER &
BUNCK, supra note 16.
25 See Zick, supra note 13, at 288-92 (discussing the "constitutive rules" of statehood).
26 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress."); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869) (the
Constitution "looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States"),
overruled by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885).
27 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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creates positive state pride and confidence. This is no small
matter.
For a sovereign state, in contrast to a merely
decentralized locus of authority, has powerful incentives to
distinguish itself and to innovate on behalf of and provide for its
own community of citizens.28
Sovereignty thus retains salience in the federalism area for a
variety of reasons. It is a symbol of limited federal power. State
sovereignty establishes a degree of order and clarity in the
largely undefined area of vertical governmental relations. It
reminds that a state is not merely a permanent fixture or
territory, but a power in its own right. It sometimes levels an
otherwise uneven playing field. Skeptics and critics may wish its
demise, but sovereignty retains vitality. Rather than dismiss it,
we must endeavor to better understand sovereignty and its
implications for federalism.
B. Two Sovereignties
Sovereignty, like federalism, is not self-defining.
To
understand the implications of the recent federalism revival, and
to assess the prospects for future revivals, we must consider the
nature, character, and substance of state sovereignty. Aside
from setting outer boundaries, do the manifestations of the
revival - principally, limitations on lawsuits against states,
prohibition of federal commandeering of state officials, and
protection of states from other perceived encroachments provide a framework for refashioning the relationship among
state, local, and central powers? What advantages does the
sovereignty the Court has bestowed actually provide to the
modern state? And if the answer, upon reflection, is "few or even
none," then how might we re-conceive sovereignty such that it
does provide a stronger foundation for federalism?
1. Status Sovereignty

In a word, the most recent federalism revival has primarily
brought about a change in state status. The tangible benefits to
28 But see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908 (1994) (arguing that federalism serves none of the
values commonly associated with it, and that states primarily serve the function of
"facilitating decentralization").
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states as a result of the revival have been remarkably minor,
relatively trivial in fact. The manner in which we speak of the
states, on the other hand, has changed dramatically in the past
decade or so. At the core of "status sovereignty" is the notion
that states inherently possess characteristics like "dignity'' and
"esteem." States, the Court has repeatedly reminded us, are not
"mere political subdivisions;" rather, they are entitled to the
degree of "respect" due a co-equal governmental institution.29
In a sense this is indeed revolutionary. At the founding, states,
like the colonies that preceded them, were likened more or less to
mere corporations. Madison identified a "gradation" of authority
"from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to
the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty."30 "The
states," Madison said, "are not in that high degree Sovereign;"
"they are Corporations with the power of Bye Laws."31
Corporations do not possess dignity or esteem. And governments
need not "respect" corporations, which are of course merely forms
of their own creation.
Without status, the states lacked all but the most basic rights,
privileges, or immunities-those conferred expressly in the
Constitution itself. Thus, for example, the early Court held that
the states did not possess any right to be immune from lawsuits
by citizens of other states.32 No state dignitary interest, the
Court said, could outweigh citizens' interests in obtaining
remedies for state wrongs.33
This was the once degraded status of the states. At least
nominally, the states occupy a much higher rank today.
Corporations lack dignity. But nations or persons have these
attributes. They also have fundamental rights. Nations enjoy
certain legal immunities. Persons, as a result of their inherent
dignity, possess fundamental rights to equal treatment, due
process, autonomy, privacy, and much more.
29 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 463-64, 477, 479 (1966)
(Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1966).
31 Id.
32 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 447 (1793), superseded by, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
33 See id. at 472 (Wilson, J.) (states must yield to larger "purposes of society); id. at
455 (describing a state as the "inferior contrivance of man").
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The core of the federalism revival has been the transformation
of states, from something akin to corporate forms to far more
dignified nations or persons. Almost by sheer linguistic fiat, the
Court has bestowed on states not only the inherent "dignity" of
nations or persons, but a host of constitutional rights as well.
Today states, like nations and persons, have "rights" to privacy,
autonomy, equality, and due process.34
Nothing in the
Constitution itself mandated this change in status. It is the
result of what the Court itself has called ''background principles"
and constitutional and historical suppositions. Dignity, esteem,
and the new states' rights are, the Court has said, inherent
attributes of statehood. They follow naturally from the fact of
being what the Constitution minimally refers to as a "state."
These analogies - to nationhood or personhood - suffer from
some rather obvious technical flaws. These are not worth
pursuing here. Far more seriously, this revival has provided
relatively little tangible or other gain for states. When one gets
to the heart of the matter, what seems to animate the "states'
rights Justices" more than anything else is the offense, the
perceived slight, to states that results from singling them out for
what turn out to be rather minor burdens or offenses. The Court
has not objected, for example, to overarching federal laws that
regulate states, so long as they treat states the same as regulated
private actors.35 The commerce power has seemingly rebounded
from the minor limitations announced in cases like Lopez and
Morrison.36 Although it has been little remarked upon in
commentary regarding the federalism revival, the Court has
routinely interpreted federal laws as preempting state laws.37
Moreover, although the process seems less than "dignified," the
Court has not moved to put an end to the incessant dangling
before the states of millions in federal monies, to "encourage"
their cooperation in federal endeavors. There are, as well, plenty
5, at 250-81 (discussing newly discovered rights of states).
528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
36 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating civil action
provision of Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559
(1995) (invalidating Gun Free School Zones Act). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct.
2195, 2215 (2005) (upholding application of federal Controlled Substances Act to locally
34

See Zick, supra note

35 See Reno v. Condon,

produced and used marijuana).
37 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (holding that
Massachusetts law regulating labeling of cigarettes was impliedly preempted).
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of chinks in the armor of state sovereign immunity.38 Finally, the
actual burdens the states were spared under the "anticommandeering" principle were minimal, indeed trivial, and in
any event easily accomplished through other means.39
It may be that the status revival is a predicate to a revival of
more substantive dimensions. But the most recent federalism
decisions suggest that the Court has already made its point and
that it is more or less content having done so to hold the lines it
has drawn.40 Indeed, the decisions, taken together, suggest that
the Court's federalism revival was largely cosmetic; the Court
seemed to have little appetite for radical alteration of the federalstate balance. It was prepared, in quite minimalist fashion, to
identify certain outer boundaries for federal power. But the
Court was not in any sense seeking to fundamentally alter "our
Federalism."41
2. Active Sovereignty
Sovereignty - like federalism, or privacy, or equality - is not a
static concept.
The concept of sovereignty has undergone
massive changes since the Constitution was framed.
The
negative, exclusive, preemptive sovereignty of Austin, Bodin, and
Hobbes has long been on the decline. Modern international
theories of sovereignty have been influenced by a climate
characterized by globalization, supra-national governance
structures, and other modern conditions. As the European Union
and other collaborative ventures demonstrate, sovereignty has as
a result become partial, partitioned, and relative.42
Once seemingly anomalous, partial or divided sovereignty is
now a global phenomenon. Thus, as in domestic constitutional
38 See Jesse H. Choper and John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment?
The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213

(2006).

39 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (relieving state officials
of temporary functions under federal gun control law). The federalism revival left largely
untouched Congress's commerce and spending powers.
40 See Raich; see also Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003)
(upholding waiver of state immunity under Family and Medical Leave Act).
41 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
42 See generally NICK BERNARD, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2002); GENE M. LYONS & MICHAEL MAsTANDUNO, BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

(1995).
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disciplines, international theorists must now strive to
understand how claims to sovereignty can have meaning in a
world where powers routinely and substantially interfere with
one another, and where claims to supremacy and preemption are
routinely challenged. There is not adequate space here to
describe the various circulating theories and meanings of
sovereignty in international relations and other disciplines.43 But
work in these areas can be used to sketch a competing vision of
state sovereignty, one that differs markedly from the status
sovereignty that has bestowed little more than limited defenses
on the domestic states. I will call this competing conception
"active sovereignty."
If one thing has become clear from recent developments with
regard to international Statehood, it is that the conferral of
status alone does not guarantee State independence, autonomy,
equality, or any other right or privilege.
Merely calling
something "sovereign" simply does not generally make it so.
States can now rarely, if ever, coerce, dictate to, or disregard
members of their communities. In a word, modern sovereignty is
relational.44 A State's claim to sovereignty is only as legitimate
as its effective exercise of the functions associated with
Statehood, both within external regimes that order power and
within States' own political communities.45
Because it is a function of serving functions, sovereignty is
increasingly viewed as principally behavioral, rather than
legal.46 As many international relations scholars have argued,
sovereignty is not a given, brute fact. It is more accurately
conceived as a social construct, a fact generated by collective
agreement.47 Insofar as the domestic states are concerned, this
agreement depends, first, on the basic constitutive rules of
statehood. As mentioned earlier, these rules entitle states to
such things as preservation, separate and independent existence,
43 For a brief overview, see Zick I, supra note 13, at 257-64.
44 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, In Memoriam: Abram Chayes,

685 (2001).

114 HARV. L.

45 See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15.
46 See Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
(distinguishing legal and behavioral sovereignty).
47 See STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note
treatments of statehood and sovereignty as social constructions).

REV.

682,

329, 330 (2004)
15

(collecting
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direct participation in matters of national governance, and a
degree of interpretive independence with respect to local laws.
These rules define a baseline for constitutional statehood. They
make it possible to speak in terms of a system of "dual
sovereignty." But they do not, a fortiori, make states sovereign.
The process of construction requires a great deal more from
states than that they meet the minimal definition of "state."
Generally speaking, collective agreements with regard to state
sovereignty depend upon states consistently and effectively
exercising a bundle of competences. States, through their actions
and the reactions to their initiatives, become associated with
these functions over time. In brief, states are sovereign under
this view insofar as those affected by state actions- other states,
federal authorities, citizens, and even foreign nations ultimately agree to treat states as sovereigns.
Like status sovereignty, active sovereignty relies to some
extent upon symbols and linguistic devices. The language of
statehood conveys and helps constitute the institutional fact of
state sovereignty. As we have seen, status sovereignty relies
upon anthropomorphisms, things like state "dignity," "offense,"
and loss of "esteem." According to status sovereignty, the states
are like inherently dignified nations, or persons. In contrast,
active sovereignty's symbols are themselves dynamic. They are
also firmly embedded in judicial, political, and social discourses.
To generate sovereignty and maintain it, states must earn the
respect and esteem of citizens and institutions by acting as
agents, trustees, communities, and laboratories of innovation.48
These are the Framers' original symbols for statehood. They
recognized that states' claims to sovereignty would depend not
upon their legal status as states, but upon how they would use
the resource of sovereignty in the world- to bargain, cooperate,
cajole, and assert claims on their own and their citizens'
behalves. 49
48 See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), at 297 (state and federal
governments are ''but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with
different powers, and designed for different purposes").
49 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), at 296 (noting that state power
would "extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State").
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A constructive account of active sovereignty can help explain
why the states are still regarded as "sovereign" at all in a
constitutional regime where superior powers are nearly always
able, as a brute matter, to override their prerogatives. The key,
according to this theory, lies in reaching collective agreements or
shared understandings that states should be recognized as
sovereign because they act and behave as such. In sum, a state
can claim to be "sovereign" insofar as it performs essential
sovereign functions and convinces relevant constituencies that it
is doing so both consistently and effectively. The modern state's
sovereignty is thus not inherently given, but always at stake.
In general terms, then, sovereignty is not primarily a negative,
prohibitive defense. It is a positive resource governments use
and maintain by actively exercising and trading upon it.
Understanding that its sovereignty is always, in some sense, at
stake, the active sovereign constantly innovates. Where national
or supra-national solutions fail or are not forthcoming, the active
sovereign steps in to fill critical gaps. It takes the lead on issues
that are of fundamental importance to a community's health,
morals and welfare, whether or not those issues have historically
or traditionally been the province of some other actor. The active
sovereign engages citizens by encouraging democratic
participation in all forums of the political community, including
courts of law. The active sovereign assists the collection of states
in carrying out national or international prerogatives in times of
emergency or other critical need. Recognizing the exigencies of
the modern governance environment, the active sovereign does
not always seek to stand on its own; rather, it surrenders some
independence by pooling or sharing its sovereignty with other
states and institutions to achieve common goals. Finally, the
active sovereign refuses to be bound by traditional notions of its
"proper" sphere of activity, whether this means seeking
opportunities on behalf of its citizens in new geographic areas or
in new regional or other governance regimes.
Active sovereignty differs from status sovereignty m
fundamental ways.
It is positive rather than negative,
innovative rather than static or tied to traditional notions
regarding the balance of power, and relational rather than
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C. Status, Function, and Federalism
For those who truly believe that power should be re-directed to
the states, the goal of any revival of federalism must be to see
that statehood not merely survives but thrives. This is not
merely a matter of improving the states' position in the federal
system, or some aesthetic makeover. A revival must invigorate
the states. It must provide them with something substantive,
such that they remain integral parts of the system of governance.
Assuming that this, or something like it, is the ultimate
objective, there are four primary reasons for states (and, as well,
courts and legislators who favor a meaningful "federalism") to
prefer active sovereignty to status sovereignty.
First, status sovereignty lacks a principled theoretical
grounding. Status sovereignty is the product, the Court says, of
certain ''background principles," inferences, and suppositions.
The Court implies that a state is like a nation, or a person; but
we are never told why this is so and, if so, what implications
these analogies portend for federalism.
This leaves status
sovereignty vulnerable to the claim that "sovereignty" is being
used as a tool of power politics rather than a principled basis for
a workable federalism. Improving state status does not provide
states with a deeper understanding of statehood or sovereignty.
It does not provide states, or anyone else for that matter, with a
framework for working through the complexities of federalism past, present, or future.
Second, status sovereignty is actually dangerous to the welfare
of states. As noted, statehood itself is rather thinly elaborated in
the Constitution. Little is conferred upon the states as a matter
of constitutional right. The fairest inference from text and
history is that everything else must be earned.
Status
sovereignty gives the states their "dignity," but nothing else.
Because it is entirely negative and defensive, status sovereignty
encourages state passivity. It requires nothing of states, other
than that they meet the rudimentary definition of "state." Status
sovereignty does not encourage the states to consider, as one
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internationalist has put it, "a ground for a forward policy of one's
own."50 It operates merely as a proscription on the action of some
other power rather than a positive source of state energy or
power. A meaningful revival of federalism cannot be based on
this sort of defensive, passive conception of statehood and state
sovereignty.
Third, status sovereignty raises what might be called "moral"
issues. It has been applied, in part, to deny citizens access to
judicial processes for the purpose of holding states accountable
for alleged constitutional violations. By virtue of their status,
what one scholar calls "laggard" states have thus been excused
from compliance with the law.51 In a sense, then, status
sovereignty licenses states to misbehave. More generally, this
conception of state sovereignty turns democracy on its head. It
places the state, which holds the people's sovereignty in trust,
above its citizens.52 This undermines basic federalism ideals like
state agency, trusteeship, and community. The problem is graver
still. In the political community of the United States, "anticommandeering" principles leave the impression that states have
some constitutional right to be let alone, that they cannot be
enlisted to serve the greater good even in times of national crisis
or emergency.
Status sovereignty prevents the redress of
constitutional violations, inverts democratic principles, and
causes fissures in the notion of political community. Rather than
ensure that states are active participants in the governance
structure, status sovereignty actually casts states as
obstructionist outliers.
Finally, history rather plainly demonstrates that status
sovereignty will not sustain a workable and robust federalism.
Previous revivals, similarly grounded upon formalistic
conceptions, have failed the tests of time and circumstance. One
revival relied upon the notion of "enclave" sovereignty, in which
50 ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

(1986).

260

51 See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and
Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2004).
52 See Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude For State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 81, 86 (2001) ("[T]he notion that states are organically bestowed
with a dignity incident to all sovereigns rests in tension with the notion that states are
mere creatures of and subservient to the truly sovereign people.").
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the Court sought to carve exclusive areas of state concern from
the larger federalism mosaic.53 Another relied upon formalistic
notions of "commerce."54 But the lesson of these so-called
"revivals" is that federalism operates on the ground, in the world.
It is too complex to be ordered with reference to such simple
legalisms.
Improving the status of states will order power to some small
degree. It will establish outer boundaries. There is, however, no
escaping the fact that states must tolerate a variety of
interferences with their internal sovereignty. The Court's most
recent precedents, which balk at extending sovereign immunity
and envision commerce and spending powers of considerable
breadth, signal tacit recognition of this unavoidable reality. In
the end, status sovereignty provides some short-term benefits to
state treasuries. It may make the states "feel" better. But it
provides no foundation for a real revival of statehood or
federalism.

II. The Active Sovereign: Federalism Revival?
Let us consider, then, the implications of active sovereignty for
the future of our federalism. States will perform many functions
regardless of whether they are labeled "sovereign." State officials
will work on behalf of their citizens because they were elected or
appointed to do just that. The active sovereign does more than
this bare minimum, however. It does more that merely subsist.
It extends itself, knowing that its sovereignty is in some sense
always at stake.
Federalism has long been thought to dictate that certain
matters are "local" and others "national." The active sovereign
seeks to remake federalism on its own terms, rather than on the
terms dictated to it by tradition or some more powerful sovereign.
To remake federalism on their own terms, or at least attempt
this, states must understand how valid claims to sovereignty are
actively made and sustained over time. This Part will review
some of the on-the-ground activities that might serve as a
53 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
efforts to identify exclusive enclaves of state power).
54 See e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

(1937)

(abandoning
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foundation for a federalism revival in and by the states. There is
much, by way of innovation and energy, for other states to
imitate, and to expand upon, in the examples described below.
The basic lesson for states in what follows is that the revival
must come from within.
A. Taking the Lead: State Innovations

The Framers believed that the states would serve the people in
several functional capacities. They perceived states as agents
and trustees of the people, and as places where innovative
policymaking would occur.55 States would earn their sovereignty,
the Framers believed, by providing critical services to and
connections for local populations. But federalism is obviously far
more complex today than it was at the framing. States, as the
examples below illustrate, are no longer confining themselves to
what might traditionally have been considered "local" matters.
They are engaged in efforts to alter the federal-state balance on
their own terms, either by branching into areas of "national"
concern or taking back what they view as issues rightfully theirs
in the first place.
Indeed, states have increasingly been active with respect to
critical policy matters that Washington cannot, or will not,
address. Mter a recent period of dormancy, owing no doubt in
part to state budgetary shortfalls, states during the past decade
have taken a leading position on a number of critical issues. So
much attention is regularly focused on Congress, and on the
battle over federalism waged in the Supreme Court, that this
activity tends to receive inadequate attention. But states are
beginning to get noticed again.
They are beginning to
aggressively push back against coercive federal laws. They are
filling substantial gaps where federal legislation has stalled.
News items noting that the states have "taken the lead" are
becoming much more common.
Although many recent state innovations might be listed, I will
briefly highlight just a few. For example, states have been
leading the way in adopting innovative policies relating to critical

55 See Althouse, supra note 51, at 1750· 76 (elaborating on "laboratory" metaphor).
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energy and environmental issues.56 As federal clean air laws
have been watered down and riddled with exemptions, states
have been forced to act creatively to enforce air quality
standards. For example, the North Carolina Attorney General
recently sued the Tennessee Valley Authority to prevent out-ofstate power plants from sending air pollution into the state on
the ground that the pollution constitutes a nuisance.57
Health matters have been a special area of recent state
innovation. The nation is experiencing a health care crisis.
Recent state activity in this area has been a matter of emergency
and necessity. For example, several states recently intervened
when the newly revised Medicare prescription drug program left
many low-income citizens without adequate coverage.58
California took emergency action to assist nearly one million
citizens in filling their prescriptions. Several other states were
forced to take similar action during the drug program's troubled
transition period. Massachusetts recently enacted landmark
health care legislation, providing health care for virtually all of
its citizens.59
Pharmaceutical costs in general have been an increasing area
of national concern. Congress has done little to solve the problem
of rising drug prices. But states from Maine to Florida have
offered their own unique solutions.60 Maine developed a
purchasing pool to give the state more leverage when purchasing
from drug firms. Florida and Michigan provided by law that if
drug companies want access to their markets, they must offer
deep discounts on drugs.
Massachusetts and other states
employed comparison shopping to lower their citizens' costs. The
states have acted in a host of other health-related areas,
including medical malpractice reform, food safety, and
restrictions on tobacco use, where federal authorities have
56 See, e.g., Rebecca Smith, States Take Lead in Widening Use of Green Energy, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 22, 2004, at A8.
57 See Editorial, New Strategy on Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at A12.
58 See Robert Pear, States Intervene After Drug Plan Hits Early Snags, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2006, at Al.
59 See Pam Belluck & Katie Zezima, Massachusetts Legislation on Insurance Becomes
Law, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2006.
60 See Abraham McLaughlin, States Take Lead on Drug Costs Cuts, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1.

562

SF. JOHN'SJOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:2

experienced decades-long stalemates or have done little or
nothing owing to industry pressure and influence.
Living wage issues have become another area of acute concern.
Congress remains gridlocked on these issues too. But states, as
agents and trustees, have recently stepped in to fill this critical
void. Maryland, for example, enacted a law that would require
large businesses to cover a set percentage of employee health
costs.61 States have also taken the lead on raising the minimum
wage.62 Despite a decade-long freeze in the federal minimum
wage, nearly half of the civilian labor force now lives in states
where the rate is higher than the federal minimum. This has
resulted in a shift of lobbying attention, as labor officials see
more meaningful prospects for reform in the states.
Active sovereignty also entails states making claims to
sovereignty with respect to fundamental social issues as well.
Many states are already doing so. They have made strong claims
to sovereignty in enacting laws and constitutional amendments
regarding abortion, the death penalty, and same-sex marriage.63
Thus, active sovereignty, like federalism itself, does not
automatically lead to "liberal" policies. It favors neither "liberal"
nor "conservative" causes.
Active sovereignty encourages
sovereign states to determine fundamental social policies and to
innovate even with respect to issues of national concern.
These examples could be multiplied many times over. The
point is that states must recognize that fewer and fewer issues
are matters solely for federal action. An active sovereign does not
wait for federal action that may never come. It does not assume
that any issue is necessarily outside its competence. As the
Medicare episode demonstrates, that sort of passivity can be
physically harmful, even deadly, for a state's citizens. When
states perform emergency functions competently, they maintain
and reinforce their sovereignty. When they fail, however, as
many believe they did in the days and weeks following Hurricane
61 See Michael Barbaro, Maryland Sets a Health Cost for Wal-Mart, N_y. TIMES, Jan.

13, 2006, at Al.

62 See John M. Broder, States Take Lead In Push To Raise Minimum Wages, N.Y.
TlMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at Al.
63 See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Court Limits Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. Times,
March 30, 2006; Belluck, supra note 17 (noting recent South Dakota law prohibiting
abortions except where the mother's life is in danger).
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Katrina, for example, the states undermine their- and perhaps
other states' - claims to sovereignty. Insofar as the states' first
reaction in times of turmoil is to look to federal officials for relief,
they place their sovereignty at stake.64 As they earn respect and
sovereignty, so too can states lose it by failing to provide positive
solutions. Mississippi officials seemed to realize this; Louisiana
officials unfortunately did not. The next disaster, which may not
be far off, will be handled in light of successes and failures
previously demonstrated at the local level.
Proposals to
federalize emergency response efforts are already on the table.
Passive and incompetent states invite this sort of federal
intervention. This will likely be one of Katrina's enduring
lessons.
Although active sovereignty generally focuses on prescribing a
program of positive self-help for states, there are some lessons for
the judiciary as well. One of the ironies of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism revival was the extent to which the Court was willing
to interpret broadly the doctrine of implied preemption. This
may have two systemic effects. The first, and most obvious, is
that federal law displaces the very state innovations we have
been examining. Whatever minor gains flowed from the states'
status revival can be erased several-fold by the preemption of
state health and safety programs. The second effect may be that
states, concerned that their efforts will be for naught, will act
more passively and timidly. Rather than pursue their own way
forward, states will await federal action that may not be
forthcoming.
Courts committed to federalism and state
sovereignty should approach preemption and other doctrines that
undermine state action with far greater concern for these effects.
Active sovereignty obviously requires far greater energy and
innovation than status sovereignty does. It requires that states
begin to fundamentally and independently rethink the federalstate balance. As Professor Amar has suggested, "federalism
cuts both ways."65 States "can gain political goodwill" by
protecting their citizens from federal shortcomings.66 By acting
-

64 See Editorial, Out to Lunch, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Oct. 21, 2005, at A14.
65 Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1428 (1987).
66 See id. at 1428-29.
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in an innovative fashion, states can use their sovereignty not as a
defensive shield but as a "toolO to right government wrongs."67
B. Democracy and Community
The framers created the states not only to be agents, trustees,
and laboratories of innovation, but also as distinct communities.
An active sovereign strives for distinction. Indeed, despite many
similarities, states are unique in important respects. Even such
seemingly minor things as state slogans ought to be viewed as
demonstrative of state sovereignty. "Don't Mess With Texas,"
"Live Free or Die," and the recently coined "New Jersey: Come
See for Yourself' are all expressions of separateness and
distinction.
They express something about their political
communities and citizenries, whether it is swagger, or
libertarianism, or self-deprecation. These are, of course, minor
symbolic matters. They must be considered along with state
governance institutions, policies, geography, common industry,
and other things that comprise a state community.
The states are political communities. One of the most critical
functions states serve as political communities is to provide local
opportunities for citizens to exercise self-governance. Today
there is abundant talk of popular constitutionalism.68 However,
the fact remains that the Constitution contains no distinct
mechanism whereby "the People" can participate directly in dayto-day governance. But the states, as derivative sovereigns, can
provide such opportunities. To the extent they do so, active
states further strengthen their claims to sovereignty by
strengthening their ties to the citizenry.
Some of the innovations described above resulted from direct
democracy mechanisms like state initiatives and referenda.
Roughly half the states currently allow for citizen initiatives.
Policies determined in this direct fashion run the gamut, from
affirmative action to stem cell research to redistricting to samesex marriage. More states should provide for direct governance
of this sort, and states should continue to expand the subjects
67

See id.

68 See,
e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW {2004).

PEOPLE

THEMSELVES:

POPULAR

2007]

AC17VE SOVEREIGNTY

565

that can be addressed in this fashion. These measures can come
substantially to define a community. By initiative, California
has sought to establish itself as the "Silicon Valley'' for stem cell
research. Oregon, as a result of its high-profile battle over
assisted suicide, is now indelibly associated with the
fundamental right to choose how one's life ends. Through these
governance mechanisms, states can stake out an identity based
upon tax policies, individual rights, or any other characteristic
that can be put to the people at the ballot.
Although many states are showing vital progress m
encouraging political participation, there are many "laggard"
states too.
The duty to provide opportunities for political
participation extends beyond the initiative and referendum. An
active sovereign does not, as many states currently do, prohibit
any class of citizen from exercising the franchise. Measures that
prevent felons, or parolees, or probationers, from voting
undermine state claims to sovereignty by severing a critical tie
with whole classes of citizens.69 These measures devalue the
notion of political community.
So do claims to "sovereign
immunity." Courts are part of the political community. And
open courts are a critical aspect of self-governance. The active
sovereign does not seek judicial immunities when faced with
allegations of wrongdoing.
Rather, the sovereign state
voluntarily waives its immunity. States must recognize that
waivers of immunity are exercises of state sovereignty, not
derogations of it.
States communities do not exist in isolation. The domestic
states are part of a community of United States. The active
sovereign accepts that its internal sovereignty can be invaded for
a variety of legitimate reasons relating to community interests.
Many States have had to come to terms with this fact in the
international context. Just as most European States must now
bargain within the community of the Union, states have always
had to bargain and perform in collective regimes. This means
that they must cooperate, compromise, and sometimes settle.
Bargains once made, such as the bargain on radioactive waste at
69 See Editorial, Voting Rights Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at A24 (noting
that felon voting bans denied the franchise to some five million people in the most recent
federal elections).
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issue in New York v. United States, 70 must be honored by
sovereign states. Otherwise, its future claims to sovereignty will
likely be compromised. Because state sovereignty is relational,
collective needs may outweigh a state's own interests. State
sovereignty sometimes entails a claim to autonomy. But there
are times when sovereignty lies in effective cooperation rather
than isolation.
States do not necessarily advance their
sovereignty by attacking federal measures as intrusive acts of
"commandeering." Sovereignty, recall, is relational. Thus, the
active sovereign can generally be counted on to assist the larger
community of states in times of need.
Active sovereignty requires that states, as political
communities, provide the sorts of direct governance opportunities
that the federal · Constitution omits.
The initiative and
referendum will likely play a substantial role in any future
federalism revival.
Active sovereignty requires that states
broaden the franchise, open courts to citizen complaints, and
accept collective responsibilities.
C. "Pooled Sovereignty''
States acting as agents, trustees, laboratories, and political
communities in the circumstances above are still acting
according to traditional federalism norms. Although they are
seeking to expand their sovereignty by recasting the federal-state
balance and opening new opportunities for political participation,
states are still performing traditional functions. The active
sovereign must do more.
It must look beyond traditional
functions, forms, and arrangements.
As noted, sovereignty has been recast in certain international
contexts as partial and relational. The "new sovereignty" of
States is considered a resource rather than an absolute,
proscriptive defense. 71 When states act in the collective, rather
than making their own way, this is sometimes referred to as an

70 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
71 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 27 ("The only way most states can realize
and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that
regulate and order the international system.").
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exercise of "pooled" or "shared" sovereignty.72 States are
increasingly banding together to accomplish goals that no single
State could achieve on its own.
The old notion of domestic state sovereignty was one of
exclusion and isolation. State sovereignty entitled a state to
exclude other states, and sometimes federal authorities, from its
internal affairs. Increasingly, however, the American states, like
European States, have been pooling their sovereignties in
innovative ways, combining with other states in pacts, reciprocity
agreements, and other arrangements. To advance claims to
sovereignty in national regimes like Congress and federal
agencies, states are exerc1smg their sovereignties not
individually and proscriptively, but rather relationally and
positively, in combination with other sovereigns.
For example, seven Northeast states recently joined a regional
pact that would limit carbon dioxide emissions linked to global
climate change.73 Greenhouse gas emission is an issue that
federal regulators have, for a variety of reasons, failed to address.
Under the states' agreement, the first collective effort in the
United States to adopt mandatory controls for greenhouse gases,
states joining the pact would reduce emissions by 2020. Each
state would set its own cap on emissions. The pact relies on
innovative market principles.
For example, states can
accumulate unused excess allowances and then sell or trade
them in an open market. Supporters of the pact insist that it will
not only provide a sound regional solution, but will also
encourage participating states to support clean energy
alternatives, thereby creating local business opportunities and
enhancing competition with European countries.
West Coast governors have pursued another pooling strategy
for addressing the global warming issue. They recei.i.tly agreed to
use their combined purchasing power to buy fuel-efficient
72 See William Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox, 47 PoL.
503, 519 (1999) (sovereignty is increasingly '"held in common,' 'pooled among
governments, negotiated by thousands of officials ... compromised through acceptance of
regulations and court judgments"').
73 See Anthony DePalma, Greenhouse Gas Pact is in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2005, at B3. The states are Delaware, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, and Vermont. Massachusetts and Rhode Island backed out of the agreement,
but may decide later to re-join the pact.
STUD.

568

SF. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:2

vehicles for official use, develop uniform appliance-efficiency
standards, collaborate to measure and report greenhouse gas
emissions, and reduce the use of diesel generators on ships in
California, Washington, and Oregon ports.74 The governors'
informal agreement allowed states to achieve a common goal
without ceding any internal sovereignty over energy or
environmental policies.
States have pooled their sovereignties in other ways to address
significant policy issues. A single state that decides to sue the
federal government is in a decidedly weaker position than a state
that joins with two, or ten, additional states. Collective lawsuits
by states are trending upward. Many of these lawsuits are
positive, shared exercises of state sovereignty. Twelve states
recently sued the federal Environmental Protection Agency to
force it to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. 75 Similarly,
coalitions of states have recently sued the federal government in
challenges to the No Child Left Behind Act, Medicare
reimbursements, energy standards, and prescription drugs. 76
These claims face substantial burdens in the courts. But the
lawsuits, as exercises of state sovereignty, are not solely aimed at
achieving legal success. The apparent hope is that they may
ultimately convince federal officials to alter policies relating to
these critical issues.
As noted, active sovereignty perceives sovereignty as a
bargaining resource that states can rely upon in the course of
participating in national institutions of governance. Concerned
that smaller states were obtaining more than an equitable share
of federal aid in Congress, the governors of the nation's four most
populous states recently joined together to lobby Congress. The
so-called "Big Four" - Arnold Schwarzenegger of California,
George Pataki of New York, Rick Perry of Texas, and Jeb Bush of
74 See Brad Knickerbocker, States Take the Lead on Global Warming, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2003, at 1.
75 See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General, Office of New
York State Attorney General, States, Cities Environmental Groups Sue Bush
Administration on Global Warming, Challenge EPA's Refusal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Pollution
(Oct.
23,
2003),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.
us/press/2003/oct/oct23a_03.html.
76 See Evan Halper, State to Sue U.S. Over Medicare, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 2,
2006, at B3; Juliet Williams, California to Sue Over Federal Prescription Drug Plan, THE
SACRAMENTO UNION, Feb. 2, 2006.
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Florida - have pooled their states' sovereignties to lobby on
issues ranging from federal aid to energy to labor displacement. 77
The effort may be unprecedented; political scientists, strategists,
and historians are hard pressed to recall any similar formal
agreements among governors.
Pacts, collective suits, and lobbying partnerships do not
exhaust the recent trend toward pooled state sovereignty.
Common markets are another example. The Academic Common
Market, for example, is a reciprocity agreement among sixteen
southern states that allows undergraduate and graduate
students to enroll at a university in another state while paying
in-state tuition.78 Through this pact, states can avoid
maintaining costly programs of study with insufficient demand;
students of course can save tuition dollars. These reciprocity
a,greements have grown in popularity over the past decade.79 By
pooling sovereignty in this innovative manner, states have
managed to partly solve internal education concerns.
Interstate cooperation is, of course, not a new development.so
But the states are increasingly conceptualizing and formalizing
arrangements to address perceived national, as opposed to purely
local or regional, issues of critical importance. A revitalized
federalism will depend, to some extent, on activity that leverages
individual state sovereignties in this fashion. These innovative
exercises of shared or pooled sovereignty should be encouraged,
studied, and perhaps replicated. But there is still much we need
to know about these pooling arrangements. We need to know the
conditions under which they work successfully, and under which
they fail.
How are individual state concerns within the
cooperative addressed? How do internal state politics affect
these pooling arrangements? What effect, if any, do these sorts
of agreements have on internal state sovereignty? Under what
77 See Raymond Hernandez & AI Baker, Governors Join As 'Big Four' To Pool Clout,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at Bl.
78 See Divya Watal, Think Globally, Pay Locally, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept.
5, 2005, at 55.
79 For example, the Midwest Student Exchange Program is a similar consortium of
six Midwestern states: Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and North
Dakota. Bee id.
80 See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS (2002) (noting relative lack of scholarly interest in
interstate agreements).
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conditions have they actually altered national policies? States
should be examining these arrangements, sharing information
and resources with other states, and joining collective efforts
where joint action is appropriate.

THE STATES AS "DEMI-SOVEREIGNS": FOREIGN RELATIONS

All of the foregoing examples implicate active internal
sovereignty- control over matters of mostly local concern. One
of the principal obstacles to viewing the domestic states as
sovereign has been the (mostly) implied prohibition on their
exercising authority in matters touching on foreign affairs.81 The
states do not possess external sovereignty, in the sense of being
authorized to deal directly with foreign nations. As a result <;>f
the dormant foreign affairs power and the dormant foreign
commerce power, courts have effectively precluded the states
from affecting matters as to which it is said the United States
must "speak with one voice."82
The active sovereign refuses to accept antiquated notions of its
"proper" place not only within the federal system, but also in the
world. Although technically constrained by dormant foreign
affairs doctrines, some scholars have noted that states have
heightened their international profile.83 Indeed, one scholar
suggests that the states have recently been treated as "demisovereigns" - de facto powers in their own right - in foreign
relations.84 Conditions of modernity, in particular advances in
communications technology and globalization, have caused "a
marked blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic
affairs."85 State and local governments have been more
conspicuous players on the international scene, particularly with
81 There are of course some textual limitations on states in this regard. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. I. § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from entering agreements or compacts with
foreign powers).
82 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979);
Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One· Voice" Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 975, 979-88 (2001) (describing and criticizing the "one voice" doctrine).
83 See, e.g. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223,

1275 (1999).
84

85

See id. at
See id. at

1225.
1247.

2007]

AC17VE SOVEREIGNTY

571

regard to matters of trade and investment, but also with respect
to human rights issues.86 On the ground, states maintain trade
offices abroad, enter trade agreements with foreign countries,
and routinely send out foreign trade missions.87
Thus, state claims to a measure of external sovereignty have
begun to arise from efforts to influence economic and other
policies in international regimes. Here, again, is an indication of
the importance of looking for the federalism revival on the
ground and in the world. It has long been the case that states
play a far more active role in foreign affairs than federalism
doctrine would suggest they should.88 Today, the states are
positioned to act separately from the federal government in many
areas of foreign affairs, to pursue their own and their political
communities' interests abroad. State activity has created the
conditions under which "a new doctrine of subnational
responsibility''
is
taking
hold.89
Increasingly,
foreign
governments perceive states as separate sovereigns.
In
constructive terms, collective agreements are beginning to form
regarding states' sovereignty in external matters.
Foreign
nations sometimes deal directly with the states on matters such
as tax policy, immigrants' rights, and the death penalty.90 This
means that California, or Texas, are individually subject to
discipline, or "targeted retaliation," for their actions.91 This is one
indication that state claims to de facto sovereignty are gammg
some traction abroad.
Within still largely undefined limits, states have unique
opportunities to make claims to sovereignty on a global stage. As
active sovereigns, states should be eager to take advantage of
86 See id. ("The magnitude of state and local international activity has grown
dramatically in recent years.") See generally EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1998) (describing rising
influence of states in foreign affairs).
87 See FRY, supra note 86, at 84-88 (describing state and local trade missions).
88 See Cleveland, supra note 82, at 991 ("Despite the apparent clarity of the
constitutional text, actual relations between the states and the national government over
foreign relations have been significantly more nuanced, and the boundaries of state
authority remain unclear.").
89 Spiro, supra note 83, at 1261.
90 See id. at 1261-70; see also Carla Fried, How States Are Aiming to Keep Dollars Out
of Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, C5 (describing state laws barring public pension
funds from investing in companies with ties to· Sudan, a country accused of extensive
human rights violations).
91 Spiro, supra note 83, at 1261.
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opportunities to act as agent, trustee, community, and innovator
in a vast new global environment. States can use their spending
and other powers to express moral claims, direct the expenditure
of substantial funds, procure business opportunities for citizens
back home, control their borders, and encourage policy changes
at the national and international levels.
To be sure, substantial constitutional and political checks still
constrain the states' foreign affairs activity. This is as it must
be. There are instances in which the country still must speak
with one voice. National security is an obvious example, and
there is no doubting that federal authorities will remain
committed to having "one voice" on such matters. But federal
authorities should hesitate to interfere with most state
prerogatives overseas, especially those dealing with trade and
investment. Congress will naturally hesitate to intervene, often
for political reasons. But there are constitutional reasons for
permitting state activity in these areas.
Like any other
structural principle, federalism must be flexible. It must be able
to respond to and accommodate globalization and other
conditions of modernity. More to the point, our federalism must
recognize the on-the-ground reality that states are now global
actors.92 Their sovereignty can no longer be confined within our
borders.93
An expansion of state sovereignty does not entail political
actors and courts sitting idly by while states cause major
disruptions in foreign affairs and visit substantial harm on the
Union. It merely suggests that "the rule of federal exclusivity no
longer presents an imperative the way it once arguably did."94
When this principle ought to apply, and which institution is best
situated to enforce it, would be fruitful paths for future academic
research. In the meantime, the best advice for states is to
continue practicing active state sovereignty in foreign arenas. A
92 See Cleveland, supra note 82, at 995 (noting historical tolerance by federal
government of local activity touching foreign affairs).
93 Courts seeking to encourage a more vibrant federalism should not aggressively
graft "dormant" limitations on foreign affairs and commerce powers. Nor should they, as
they have in the domestic context, use a broad interpretation of implied preemption to
negate state actions overseas. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363
(2000) (invalidating, on preemption grounds, a Massachusetts Jaw barring state entities
from doing business with companies operating in Burma).
94 Spiro, supra note 83, at 1259.
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federalism revival must extend beyond narrow notions of "local"
concern.
CONCLUSION

The Court's "federalism revival" did not produce any
substantive alteration of the federal-state ordering of power.
Minimalist opinions marking off outer bounds of congressional
power did not revive federalism in any significant way.
Emphasizing the status, dignity, and esteem of states might
make states "feel" better. Ultimately, however, a judicially
imposed status sovereignty cannot sustain a robust and vital
federalism.
If there is to be a federalism revival, it must be based upon
states doing, not merely being. It must be a bottom-up, rather
than a top-down, phenomenon. States must engage their own
sovereignty, treating it as something that is not given to them,
but always at stake and ultimately earned in the world. The
concept of active sovereignty recognizes that states become
sovereign only to the extent that they exercise sovereign
functions and are, as a result, treated as sovereign. The active
sovereign must be innovative. It must take the lead on critical
matters and in emergencies, create vibrant political
communities, establish and use new arrangements of power, and
stake claims to sovereignty in arenas not traditionally associated
with statehood.
Active sovereignty demonstrates that state sovereignty does
not conflict with, but actually enhances and supports, popular
sovereignty. A citizen without safe food to eat, clean air to
breathe, a job, a living wage, and the means to participate
directly in governance is herself a diminished sovereign. The
active state sovereign is not concerned with ego or status. It is
concerned, rather, with providing the conditions for popular
sovereignty. The principal beneficiaries of active sovereignty will
not be the states, as has been the result in the Court's status
sovereignty rulings, but the people themselves.

